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Abstract
To assess the extent of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A (H5N1) virus transmission, we conducted sero-
epidemiologic studies among close contacts exposed to H5N1 cases in mainland China during 2005–2008. Blood specimens
were collected from 87 household members and 332 social contacts of 23 H5N1 index cases for HPAI H5N1 serological
testing by modified horse red-blood-cell hemagglutinin inhibition and microneutralization assays. All participants were
interviewed with a standardized questionnaire to collect information about the use of personal protective equipment,
illness symptoms, exposure to an H5N1 case during the infectious period, and poultry exposures. Two (2.3%) household
contacts tested positive for HPAI H5N1 virus antibody, and all social contacts tested negative. Both seropositive cases had
prolonged, unprotected, close contact with a different H5N1 index case, including days of bed-care or sleeping together
during the index case’s infectious period, and did not develop any illness. None of the 419 close contacts used appropriate
personal protective equipment including 17% who reported providing bedside care or having physical contact with an
H5N1 case for at least 12 hours. Our findings suggest that HPAI H5N1 viruses that circulated among poultry in mainland
China from 2005–2008 were not easily transmitted to close contacts of H5N1 cases.
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Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A (H5N1) viruses
spread widely in poultry and migratory birds across 64 countries in
Asia, Middle East, Europe and Africa [1], especially during 2005–
06. During November 2003 to 16 June 2013, 630 human cases
confirmed with HPAI H5N1 virus infection, including 375 deaths
(60%) had been reported from 15 countries [2]. Most H5N1
patients have experienced severe pneumonia that often progresses
rapidly to the acute respiratory distress syndrome [3]. Surveillance
for H5N1 cases has mostly focused on hospitalized pneumonia
cases, but the denominator of cases of human infection with HPAI
H5N1 viruses, including asymptomatic [4] and mild illness [5,6] is
unknown. However, a meta-analysis inferred that a large number
of people, particularly in Asia, have been infected with HPAI
H5N1 viruses without severe illness [7].
Currently, sporadic human cases of HPAI H5N1 virus infection
continue to be identified, especially in countries with enzootic
HPAI H5N1 virus circulation among poultry. Recent experiments
have demonstrated that genetically-modified HPAI H5N1 viruses
were capable of respiratory transmission between ferrets [8,9].
Furthermore, some of the mutations associated with transmission
among ferrets are already present in HPAI H5N1 viruses currently
circulating among poultry [10,11].
The extent of avian-to-human and human-to-human transmis-
sion of HPAI H5N1 viruses should therefore be monitored
through sero-epidemiological surveys, especially when sympto-
matic H5N1 cases are identified. Here we report the results of
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sero-epidemiologic studies conducted among close contacts
exposed to H5N1 case-patients during 2005–2008 in mainland
China.
Materials and Methods
Between October 2005, when the first case of HPAI H5N1 virus
infection was detected by surveillance in mainland China [12] and
February 2008, 30 confirmed human H5N1 cases per WHO
criteria [13] were identified. Of these H5N1 cases, 22 from
southern China were infected by clade 2.3.4 H5N1 viruses, and
one from northern China had clade 2.2 H5N1 virus infection. The
clinical and epidemiologic characteristics of Chinese H5N1 cases
have been reported elsewhere [14,15]. We excluded the close
contacts of seven H5N1 cases from the present analysis, as data
were not complete for five cases’ contacts, and serological data
from investigations of close contacts of two H5N1 cases in a family
cluster were reported previously [16]. Therefore, we conducted
sero-epidemiological investigations of antibodies to HPAI H5N1
viruses among the close contacts of 23 (77%) H5N1 cases from 11
provinces (Table 1).
Definitions
Close contacts, including household and social contacts, were
defined as individuals who reported face-to-face contact within 1
meter of an H5N1 case, or direct contact with an H5N1 case-
patients’ respiratory secretions or feces, or clothing contaminated
with respiratory secretions or feces, during an H5N1 case-patients’
infectious period. The infectious period was defined as the time
beginning one day before the illness onset of an H5N1 case-patient
to the time of hospital discharge or death. Household contacts
were defined as all persons who lived with an H5N1 case for part
or all of the case-patient’s infectious period. Social contacts were
defined as non-household contacts and included relatives, visitors,
neighbors, colleague, teachers, classmates, roommates, friends,
and others. Serology results were included if contacts’ convalescent
sera were collected $11 days (minimum incubation period of 3
days in clusters in which human-to-human transmission might
occur [3] plus minimum time for antibody response 8 days after
illness onset [17]) after the last exposure to the corresponding
H5N1 case.
Enrollment
Once an H5N1 case was confirmed, an investigation team
including staff of the local CDC and China CDC were
immediately sent to investigate any potential source of HPAI
H5N1 virus infection for the index case and identify his/her close
contacts for additional case finding, and to assess the potential for
human-to-human transmission. If the investigators identified
households and places (e.g. poultry farm, wet poultry market,
restaurant, health care facilities, work place) known to have been
visited by the H5N1 index case during their infectious period, all
persons in the household and at places visited by an index case
were screened to identify close contacts. As part of the public
health outbreak response to H5N1 in China, close contacts are
required to be registered and placed under daily medical
surveillance for fever and respiratory symptoms for 10 days after
their last exposure to an H5N1 case. These contacts were advised
to limit movements and stay home during this period.
Informed consent was obtained from participants during their
10-day quarantine following exposure to a confirmed H5N1 case.
Eligible study subjects consisted of adults or children aged .1
year, and who met the definition of a close contact.
Questionnaire
A structured questionnaire was developed and administered to
each participant during a face-to-face interview after obtaining
consent to participate in the study. We collected information on
demographics, use of personal protective equipment, use and
compliance with antiviral chemoprophylaxis, influenza vaccina-
tion status, illness symptoms, exposure to an H5N1 case, and other
potential H5N1 risk factors (direct or close contact with sick, dead,
or well-appearing poultry, visiting a wet poultry market, and
exposure to individuals with febrile respiratory illness) during the
period starting two weeks before the last exposure to an H5N1
index case up to the time of questionnaire administration. An adult
household member (e.g., parent or legal guardian) was interviewed
as a proxy for any study participant contact who was considered
incapacitated or aged ,10 years old.
Specimen Collection
A blood specimen was collected from close contacts for acute
and convalescent sera (#1 week, and $11 days after the last
known exposure to an H5N1 case, respectively) for H5N1
serological testing. Each blood specimen was collected by
venipuncture (5 ml for those $18 years old; 2–5 ml for those
10–17 years old; 1–2 ml for those ,10 years old), and placed on
ice packs, and transported to the local CDC for processing. Serum
was separated, split into 4 aliquots and temporarily frozen at
220uC at local CDC laboratories, and shipped on dry ice to the
National Influenza Center (NIC) in Beijing, Chinese Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) within 4 days after
collection and stored at 270uC.
Laboratory Testing
All sera were tested between March and July 2008 at the NIC.
Appropriate antigens for the serological assays were selected based
on the antigenic characteristics of HPAI H5N1 viruses circulating
in the region at the time of sera collection. We used HPAI H5N1
virus strains isolated from 18 of 23 H5N1 cases, and two viruses
isolated from poultry that were epidemiologically-linked to two
serologically-confirmed H5N1 cases as antigens in the serological
assays for each contact exposed to the corresponding H5N1 case
(case-patient numbers 1 and 2, Table 1). For serological testing of
exposed contacts of three H5N1 cases (case-patient numbers 7, 9,
18) from southern China without isolation of HPAI H5N1 viruses
from either the respective H5N1 index cases or poultry
epidemiologically-linked to the cases, a representative HPAI
H5N1 virus strain [clade 2.3.4, A/Anhui/1/2005(H5N1)] was
used as antigens.
We conducted antigenic analysis by testing three HPAI H5N1
index case-patients’ convalescent sera (case-patient numbers 2, 7,
18) against the strains which were selected as antigens to test the
sera for their contacts. We found that the selected strains were
antigenically similar. A four-fold increase of antibody against
HPAI H5N1 virus was found when we used A/CK/HN/21/
05(H5N1) [18] and A/Anhui/1/2005(H5N1) to test the acute and
convalescent sera for two HPAI H5N1 index cases (case-patient
numbers 1, 9), respectively. Thus we believe that antigenically
similar HPAI H5N1 virus strains were used to test the sera for
contacts of these five index cases from whom HPAI H5N1 virus
strains were not isolated.
All samples were screened using the modified horse red-blood-
cell hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) assay [19] for H5N1 virus
antibodies in bio-safety level (BSL) 2 conditions. Sera with an HI
titer of $40 were then tested by microneutralization (MN) [20]
assay in an enhanced BSL 3 containment laboratory. The HI
assay can detect antibody against the globular head of the
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hemagglutinin, and a broadly neutralizing anti-HA stalk antibody
produced by HPAI H5N1 virus infection can be detected by the
MN assay alone. [21,22] Because of limited resources, we only
tested a random sample of sera with an HI titer of ,40 for
neutralizing antibody using MN assay for quality control.
Sera with a neutralizing antibody titer $40 and an HI antibody
titer $40 were adsorbed with circulating seasonal influenza A
(H1N1) and A (H3N2) viruses at that time of specimen collection
to reduce the possibility of detecting antibodies that were cross-
reactive to human influenza A viruses. Red blood cells (RBCs)
were pre-treated by an equivalent volume of potassium periodate
(KIO4) with a very low concentration of 0.5 mmol/L for 15
minutes at room temperature [23]. The treated RBCs were then
adsorbed by seasonal influenza viruses with a concentration of
6000 hemagglutinin units for 10 minutes at room temperature.
Residual virus was washed by phosphate buffer saline twice by
centrifugation. The packed RBC-Virus mixture was then equiva-
lently adsorbed with sera for 2 hours at room temperature. The
RBC-Virus mixture was removed by centrifugation and sera were
transferred to new tubes for use. The MN test was then repeated.
No change in HPAI H5N1 virus antibody titer after adsorption
indicated the presence of anti-H5 antibody, while a .4-fold
reduction in MN titer after adsorption was interpreted as evidence
for significant cross-reactivity. Sera were tested in duplicate by two
separate MN assays performed on different days.
An individual was defined to be seropositive for HPAI H5N1
virus antibody for the purposes of this study modified from WHO
criteria [13,19]: (1) For single serum, an HPAI H5N1 virus
neutralizing antibody titer of $40 for study subjects aged #14
years old, or $80 for those aged 15–59 years old, with an HI titer
of $40; or (2) a four-fold or greater rise in neutralizing antibody
titer against HPAI H5N1 virus in paired acute and convalescent
sera, with the convalescent serum having a neutralizing antibody
titer of $80 for adults or $40 for children or an HI titer of $40.
Adults aged $60 years were excluded from analysis because of
decreased specificity of the MN assays for this age group [24]. The
neutralizing antibody titers and HI titers are expressed as the
mean of 2 determinations and undetectable titers of ,10 are
expressed as 5.
Statistical Analysis
Data were entered in duplicate and verified using EpiData
software (Odense, Denmark, accessed at: http://www.epidata.dk/
links.htm). Data were analyzed with SPSS (version 17.0, SPSS
Inc., Chicago, Illinois, USA). Median and interquartile range were
calculated for continuous variables, and proportions were
calculated for categorical variables. Ninety-five percent confidence
intervals for seroprevalence were estimated with Poisson methods.
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of
China CDC in April 2007. During the early stage of HPAI H5N1
outbreak before April 2007 in China, this study was considered to
be part of a continuing public health outbreak investigation by
National Health and Family Planning Commission of China and
exempt from institutional review board assessment. Therefore,
written informed consents were not obtained from the study
subjects who were enrolled before approval of this study. The
Institutional Review Board of China CDC waived the need for
written informed consent from those participants and agreed that
we anonymized their specimens and personal information by
permanently removing personal identifiers from the database.
Anonymized samples were relabeled with a new random coding
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informed consent from adults or a parent or legal guardian for
minors aged ,18 years and informed assent from study subjects
aged 10–17 years.
Results
From October 2005 through February 2008, 527 close contacts
of 23 H5N1 cases were identified. Of these, we enrolled 419 (80%)
including 87 household members and 332 social contacts. The
median number of close contacts that were enrolled per H5N1
case was 10 (range:1–61). Household contacts mainly consisted of
family members, except four roommates of one patient who lived
with their colleague.
Demographics and Underlying Risk Conditions
The median age of the 419 close contacts was 19 years (range:
2–59 years), and 51% were male. Household members were
significantly older than social contacts (32 years vs. 11 years,
p,0.05). Other demographic characteristics and underlying risk
conditions were similar between the two groups of contacts
(Table 2). Of 71 contacts with available information, six (8%) had
underlying medical conditions, including five with neurological
Table 2. Demographic characteristics, exposure history, use of personal protective equipment, and serum collection of 419 close
contacts exposed to HPAI H5N1 case-patients, China, 2005–2008.
Household contacts,
N = 87, n (%)
Social contacts,
N = 332, n (%) Total, N = 419, n (%)
Median age – (years [interquartile range]) 32 [17–43] 11 [9–41] 19 [9–41]
Male 42 (48) 172 (52) 214 (51)
Underlying medical conditions 1/17 (6) 5/54 (9) 6/71 (8)
Seasonal influenza vaccination within previous year 0/61 (0) 5/260 (2) 5/321 (2)
Sera sample collection
Provided single serum specimen 52 (60) 136 (41) 188 (45)
Median duration between last exposure to H5N1 patient and serum
collection-(days [interquartile range])
43 [29–70] 29 [17–72] 33[18–71]
Provided paired acute and convalescent sera 35 (40) 196 (59) 231 (55)
Median duration between last exposure to H5N1 patient and acute serum
collection- (days [interquartile range])
4 [2–7] 6 [6–7] 6 [6–7]
Median duration between last exposure to H5N1 patient and convalescent
serum collection- (days [interquartile range])
57 [30–89] 54 [39–136] 54 [38–98]
Exposed to H5N1 case-patients
Provided bedside care 26 (30) 25 (8) 51 (12)
Median duration of exposure- (hours [interquartile range]) 108 [28–233] 10 [2–28] 28 [5–140]
Only had physical contact 61 (70) 1 (0) 62 (15)
Median duration of exposure- (hours [interquartile range]) 35 [4–120] 6 [6–6] 30 [4–120]
Only had indirect contact within 1 meter 0 (0) 306 (92) 306 (73)
Median duration of exposure- (hours [interquartile range]) – 3 [1–12] 3 [1–12]
Personal protection equipment (PPE) while exposed to H5N1 case-patients
N95 respirator 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Surgical mask 4 (5) 8 (2) 12 (3)
Goggle 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Face shield 2 (2) 0 (0) 2 (0)
Gloves 3 (3) 3 (1) 6 (1)
Gowns 3 (3) 1 (0.3) 4 (1)
Exposed to poultry
Contact with well-appearing poultry# 51 (59) 159 (48) 210 (50)
Contact with sick or dead poultry# 17 (20) 35 (11) 52 (12)
Visited wet poultry market* 5/17 (29) 17/54 (31) 22/71 (31)
Antiviral chemoprophylaxis
Oseltamivir 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Other antivirals 26 (30) 46 (14) 72 (17)
With febrile respiratory illness 1 (1) 4 (1) 5 (1)
Data are no. (%) of close contacts, unless otherwise indicated. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding.
#Contact with well-appearing or sick/dead poultry was defined as direct contact (e.g. touching), or indirect contact which was defined as no physical contact, but being
within 1 meter of poultry, poultry products, or poultry feces.
*A wet poultry market was defined as a place where small animals and poultry may be purchased live or slaughtered at the market.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071765.t002
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disease, and one with a haemangioma. Only 2% (5/321) of close
contacts reported receiving seasonal influenza vaccination within
the previous year.
Serology Results
A total of 650 sera were collected from 419 close contacts,
including 188 (45%) with a single serum specimen and 231 (55%)
with paired acute and convalescent sera (timeline of serum
collection shown in Table 2). Screening by HI assay yielded
antibody titers of 40 in 33 (5%) sera and $80 in 16 (2%) sera. The
distribution of HI antibody titers in contacts for whom both acute
and convalescent sera were available are shown in Table S1. All
positive samples with an HI titer $40 were tested by MN assay, in
addition to 110 sera randomly selected with HI titers ,40
(Figure 1). Interestingly, serum from an 11-year-old boy collected
21 days after his last exposure to the first reported H5N1 case in
November 2005, tested positive for HPAI H5N1 virus antibody
(MN titer = 40), although his HI titer was 20. He was a classmate
of the index H5N1 case (case-patient number 1, Table 1) and sat
close by the case for 5 days after the case-patient’s illness onset.
Overall, only two (0.48%, 95% confidence interval: 0.05%–
1.72%) of the 419 close contacts [2 of 188 (1.06%, 95% confidence
interval: 0.11%–3.83%) with a single convalescent serum speci-
men collected] had serum that met our definition as testing
seropositive for HPAI H5N1 virus antibodies. No change in HPAI
H5N1 virus antibody titer was found for these two close contacts
after adsorption with human influenza A human influenza A
(H1N1) and A (H3N2) viruses. Both seropositive individuals lived
with H5N1 cases, yielding an HPAI H5N1 virus antibody
seroprevalence of 2.3% (2/87, 95% confidence interval: 0.2%–
8.3%) among household contacts. Neither of these two contacts
developed fever or any respiratory symptom during the post-
exposure medical surveillance period. Of the 231 close contacts
with paired sera, no evidence of sero-conversion was detected. All
332 social contacts tested seronegative for HPAI H5N1 virus
antibodies.
The first seropositive case was the 4-year old daughter of an
H5N1 case (case-patient number 13, Table 1) that survived. A
single serum specimen was collected from the child on day 63 after
the last known exposure to the index case (her mother); this serum
had a neutralizing antibody titer of 40 and an HI titer of 80. The
child slept with her mother and had unprotected direct and close
physical contact with her for 5 days from the mother’s illness onset
on 11 February 2006 to her hospital admission date. During this
period, the mother experienced high fever and productive cough.
In addition, four other household contacts and two social contacts
of the index H5N1 case were also enrolled into this study. The
four household contacts shared meals together with the index case
for 5 days during the infectious period; however, none reported
providing bedside care or direct physical contact with her. The
two social contacts reported close contact (within one meter
without physical contact) for,1 hour with the index case. All close
contacts did not wear any protective equipment during their
exposure to the index case. Poultry were raised in the backyard of
the index case’s household. Six days before the index case’s illness
onset, 13 chickens were found to be sick and later died quickly.
The chickens were buried by the grandfather of the 4-year old
seropositive child. There was no report of any direct contact
between the seropositive case and the sick or dead chickens. All
other close contacts were seronegative for HPAI H5N1 virus
antibodies.
The second seropositive case was the 43-year old father of an
H5N1 case (case-patient number: 21). A neutralizing antibody titer
of 120 and an HI titer of 80 were detected in serum collected on
Day 24 after the last exposure to his 22-year-old ill son. The father
had close contact with his ill son for 9 days after the son’s illness
onset on 16 January 2008 until he died. The father provided
unprotected bedside care when his son was sick with HPAI H5N1
virus infection. He did not report contact with any other ill
persons. We also enrolled two other household contacts (the index
case’s mother and sister) and six social contacts, and all of them
were seronegative for HPAI H5N1 virus antibodies. The index
case’s mother also cared for him for 9 days, and his younger sister
cared for him for one day, but neither wore any protective
equipment. Of six social contacts that visited with the index
patient within one meter (without direct contact), five visited for
less than one hour, but one contact (the case’s uncle) was present in
the home for 7 days. Three days before the index patient’ illness
onset, chickens in the neighbor’s household began to die and all
were dead within three days. Five chickens in the index case’s
household began to die on two days after the index case’ illness
onset and all were dead within two days. The father did not have
direct or indirect contact with dead poultry. All the dead chickens
were buried by the index patient’s mother.
Exposure History and Antiviral Chemoprophylaxis
The proportions of close contacts that provided bedside care,
had physical contact, or reported close, but not direct contact
within one meter (indirect contact) of an H5N1 index case were
12% (n = 51), 15% (n = 62), and 73% (n = 306), respectively. Only
three contacts had direct contact with case-patients’ respiratory or
fecal secretions, but all were seronegative for HPAI H5N1 virus
antibodies. Among all contacts, 71(17%) reported direct contact
(provided bedside care or had physical contact) with H5N1 cases
for at least 12 hours. None of the 419 contacts wore appropriate
personal protective equipment when exposed to H5N1 cases
during the case-patients’ infectious period, and only very few
Figure 1. Flowchart of H5N1 serological testing for 419 close
contacts exposed to HPAI H5N1 cases, China, 2005–2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071765.g001
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reported wearing a surgical mask (3%, n = 12), gloves (1%, n = 6),
or gown (1%, n = 4). Twelve-percent of close contacts were also
exposed to sick or dead poultry, and 31% (22/71) had recently
visited a wet poultry market. The exposure history of household
contacts and social contacts is summarized in Table 2. Household
contacts were more likely to provide direct contact with H5N1
patients than social contacts (100% vs. 8%, p,0.05), and had
longer duration of exposure (median: 56 hours vs. 8 hours,
p,0.05). Five contacts developed mild febrile respiratory illness,
however, none tested positive for HPAI H5N1 virus antibodies by
MN assay after a median 29 days following last exposure to the
index cases.
None of the 419 close contacts received oseltamivir for
chemoprophylaxis. However, close contacts of three H5N1 cases
(n = 72, 17%) were given other antivirals for chemoprophylaxis
against influenza. This included 49 contacts of an H5N1 case that
received moroxydine for 3 days (100 mg, by mouth, three times
daily), 7 contacts of an H5N1 case that received rimantadine for 3
days (50 mg, by mouth, twice daily), and 16 contacts of an H5N1
case that received amantadine for 5 days (100 mg, by mouth, twice
daily). None of the contacts who received any antiviral
chemoprophylaxis tested positive by both HI and MN assays.
Discussion
Our findings suggest that HPAI H5N1 viruses that circulated
among poultry in mainland China during 2005 to 2008 were not
easily transmitted to or among humans. Among all 419 household
and social contacts of H5N1 cases with at least a convalescent
serum specimen, the seroprevalence of HPAI H5N1 virus
antibodies was 0.48%, including 2.3% among 87 household
contacts, and 0% among 332 social contacts. The two seropositive
household contacts were asymptomatic. None of the 419 close
contacts reported using appropriate personal protective equip-
ment, and 17% reported providing bedside care or having physical
contact with an H5N1 case for at least 12 hours.
Our findings are consistent with other published data on HPAI
H5N1 viruses that circulated among poultry during the same
periods [25–29]. In 2005–2007, sero-epidemiological surveys
reported 0–3% seroprevalence of H5 antibodies in populations
exposed to infected poultry and in poultry workers. Few
seroprevalence data among household contacts have been
published since 2004. One study conducted during the 1997
Hong Kong outbreak [30] suggested a higher frequency of HPAI
H5N1 virus transmission: 6 (12%) of 51 households contacts were
seropositive, but none of 26 social contacts. Differences in these
results may be attributable to variability in exposures, host factors,
or differences in the adaptability of HPAI H5N1 viruses to humans
[31]. Other sero-epidemiologic studies in which transmission to
close contacts of confirmed H5N1 cases was evaluated after 2004
[16,32–34] have found no evidence of human-to-human HPAI
H5N1 virus transmission. However, most of these studies have
assessed the potential for nosocomial transmission from H5N1
case-patients to healthcare workers, except for a very limited study
in household and social contacts in China [16].
Due to the few seropositive cases identified, we were unable
to study possible modes of transmission or risk factors for HPAI
H5N1 virus infection. It has been suggested that HPAI H5N1
virus transmission to humans occurs through inhalation,
ingestion, or nasal or conjunctival inoculation of material
contaminated by HPAI H5N1 virus [3]; however, in some
cases, the source of exposure to HPAI H5N1 virus is unknown
[35,36]. Although direct contact with infected sick or dead
poultry is the most common risk factor [3], it is likely that
inhalation of aerosolized HPAI H5N1 virus is the most likely
mode of transmission to infected cases. Some studies have
suggested that environmental exposures may also be a risk
factor for HPAI H5N1 virus infection. Studies found that lack
of indoor water sources was significantly associated with HPAI
H5N1 virus infection in Vietnam [37] and in Thailand [38],
and H5N1 viral RNA was frequently detected in dust, mud and
soil samples collected at farms [39,40]. Bathing/swimming in
contaminated water was associated with HPAI H5N1 virus
infection in Vietnam [41] and Cambodia [4,25].
For the two seropositive household contacts, we believe that the
most likely source of HPAI H5N1 virus infection is limited, non-
sustained human-to-human transmission. Probable limited non-
sustained human-to-human HPAI H5N1 virus transmission has
been reported in several case clusters [6,16,42,43]. Neither of the
seropositive contacts reported direct contact with sick or dead
poultry, or had visited a live poultry market, the main risk factors
for HPAI H5N1 virus infection in China [44]. However, both had
documented prolonged, unprotected close exposure (i.e. days of
providing care or sleeping together) with a symptomatic H5N1
index case, which may have resulted in human-to-human
transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus. Since backyard poultry died
at the homes of both seropositive contacts, and only a single
convalescent serum specimen was collected from each seropositive
contact, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of indirect
poultry exposure or environmental exposures as the source of
HPAI H5N1 virus transmission, either prior to or after the index
cases’ illnesses.
Notably, both seropositive household contacts were blood-
related family members of an H5N1 index case in the household.
Nearly all clusters of H5N1 cases have occurred among blood-
related family members, whether linked to a common poultry
exposure or where limited, non-sustained human-to-human
transmission likely occurred [6,16,42,43]. In one sero-epidemio-
logical study of villagers exposed to poultry, three of seven HPAI
H5N1 virus antibody seropositive individuals were blood-related
children who lived in different households, and were either
asymptomatic or experienced mild illness [4]. Our findings are
consistent with observations in other study that have hypothesized
a potential genetic susceptibility to HPAI H5N1 virus infection
[45]. Further investigations exploring the potential for host genetic
risk factors are needed.
Our study is subject to several limitations. Of the close
contacts identified, 20% did not agree to participate in the
study, and we did not enroll children younger than one year
old. Paired sera were not available from all close contacts
during the epidemiological investigations. It is possible that we
may have missed detection of HPAI H5N1 virus antibodies for
some patients with single serum specimens collected ,21 days
after the last known exposure to an H5N1 case. Nasopharyngeal
or throat swab collection combined with serum sample
collection among close contacts of H5N1 cases during an
outbreak investigation is of paramount importance to assess the
extent of transmission and denominator of infected persons
among the exposed, to assess the modes of transmission,
including the risk of human-to-human transmission, and to
assess the spectrum of illness with HPAI H5N1 virus infection.
However, without positive viral detection, conclusions based
upon a single serum specimen (without a baseline serum
specimen or a subsequent convalescent serum specimen to
document sero-conversion) may be challenging if serum is
collected too soon, or too long after the exposure occurred, as
shown in a study of the kinetics of the HPI H5N1 virus
neutralizing antibody response, including relatively lower titers
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in asymptomatic and mildly ill cases compared to severely ill
and fatal cases [17]. Strengths of our study are that we used
two serologic assays to identify evidence of HPAI H5N1 virus
infection as recommended by WHO, and we absorbed out
cross-reactive antibodies to seasonal influenza A viruses to
increase the likelihood of detecting antibodies to HPAI H5N1
virus. Nevertheless, in testing serum by MN assay from contacts
that had HI titers below the screening cutoff to define a
seropositive result ($40), one child contact with an HI titer of
20 also had an MN titer of 40. While we did not consider this
child to be seropositive by both serologic assays, this suggests
that some asymptomatic or mildly ill children may not mount a
robust antibody response to HPAI H5N1 virus infection, and
that further data are needed to define the appropriate antibody
thresholds to define seropositive results. Another possibility is
that the MN assay detected neutralizing antibodies that do not
interfere with sialic acid binding as measured by the HI assay.
For future sero-epidemiological investigations, we recommend
a standardized approach for sero-epidemiological studies, similar
to what was recently suggested for pandemic influenza: (1)
systematic sero-epidemiologic investigations following identifica-
tion of an index patient or an epizootic; (2) standardized data
collection to allow pooled analyses worldwide; (3) detailed
exposure history (timing and intensity of exposures); (4)
standardized laboratory protocols for HI and MN assays,
including cutoff titers to define seropositive results; and (5)
IRB pre-clearance for all studies or following identification of an
outbreak. Ideally, pre-approved protocols will facilitate investi-
gations of and integrated analyses of cohorts of clusters in which
human-to-human transmission likely occurred, including collec-
tion of monocytes to explore host genetic susceptibility factors.
Furthermore, prospective serial collection of sera will allow for
better understanding of the kinetics of the antibody response to
HPAI H5N1 virus infection, including persons identified with
asymptomatic, mild, and severe illness.
In conclusion, we found low seroprevalence of HPAI H5N1
virus antibodies among close contacts of H5N1 index cases. This
suggests that during 2005–2008, transmissibility of HPAI H5N1
viruses to and among exposed persons in China was low, even with
prolonged, close unprotected exposure to symptomatic H5N1
cases. However, as H5N1 viruses continue to circulate and evolve,
the risk of human-to-human transmission of H5N1 viruses is
unpredictable and could increase in the future. Seroepidemiologic
investigations among exposed individuals should be an ongoing
monitoring tool to assess whether HPAI H5N1 viruses circulating
among poultry may be adapting to transmit more efficiently to and
among people [10,11]. The ongoing epizootic of HPAI H5N1
virus among poultry in mainland China and elsewhere represents
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